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Few transactions have the potential to generate revelations about the market value of corporate assets 
and liabilities as mergers and acquisitions (M&A).  Corporate governance and control mechanisms such 
as independent directors, independent blockholders, and managerial share ownership are usually 
important predictors of the size and distribution of the incremental wealth generated by M&A 
transactions.  We add to this literature by investigating these relationships using a sample of banking 
organization M&A transactions over the period 1990-2004.  Unlike research on nonfinancial firms, the 
impact of independent directors, share ownership of the top five managers, and independent block 
holders on bank merger purchase premiums in this environment is likely to be measured more 
consistently because of industry operating standards and regulations.  It is also the case that research on 
banks in this area has not received adequate attention.  Our model controls for risk characteristics of the 
target banks, the deal characteristics, and the economic environment.  Our results are robust.  They 
support the hypothesis that independent directors may provide an important internal governance 
mechanism for protecting shareholders’ interests, especially in large-scale transactions such as mergers 
and takeovers.  We also find the results to be consistent with the hypothesis that independent 
blockholders play an important role in the market for corporate control as does managerial share 
ownership. But these effects dampen the impact of independent directors on target shareholders’ merger 
prices.  Our overall findings would support policies that promote independent outside directors on the 
board of banking firms in order to provide protection for shareholders and investors at large. 
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Corporate Governance Structure and Mergers 
 
1.    Introduction and Summary 
 
The recent financial crisis has revealed severe shortcomings in the corporate governance 
structure of financial institutions. These institutions often failed to provide, when it was most needed, the 
appropriate internal control that banking firms need in order to cultivate sound business practices. In this 
study, we focus on how the composition of the board of directors and the corporate governance 
structure, in general, can provide the checks and balances firms need in the takeover market and how 
they influence shareholders’ payoffs in mergers between banking organizations.  This study focuses on 
the impact of the target’s corporate governance structure on the purchase premium paid by the acquirer, 
and on the target and acquirer shareholders’ abnormal returns around the merger and acquisition (M&A) 
announcement date.  Our sample includes all mergers of publicly traded banking firms during the period 
1990-2004.   
Large-scale transactions like M&As are well suited to test whether board composition and the 
corporate governance structure have negative implications for shareholder wealth of either the target or 
the acquirer. The 14-year period ending with 2004 witnessed an unprecedented pace of bank M&As.  
Between 1990 and 2004, the number of bank M&As averaged about 435 per year compared with 345 
per year over the period 1980-1989.  As a result, the number of banks operating in the U.S. declined by 
approximately 40 percent between 1990 and 2004.  Our results help advance an understanding of the 
likely directions and consequences of continuing M&As in the banking industry.   
Previous studies suggest that corporate boards could act as an important internal governance 
mechanism for protecting shareholders’ interests (see Fama, 1980; and Fama and Jensen, 1983).   
Specifically, independent outside directors are thought to represent the interests of shareholders, help 
mitigate shareholder/management agency problems, and thus could potentially play an important 
monitoring role in merger transactions. If independent outside directors are more likely to make decisions 
consistent with maximizing shareholder’s wealth, then the purchase premium in merger transactions is   3
expected to be higher for targets with a greater proportion of independent outside directors than for other 
targets.  Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) find that for nonfinancial firms that are the targets of 
tender offers, the initial tender offer premium, bid premium revision, and target shareholder gains are 
higher when the target’s board is independent.  We examine the impact of independent outside directors 
on the merger prices of banking firms. 
The corporate governance literature also identifies factors other than board independence that 
may be important in the pricing of mergers.  Specifically, previous studies suggest that share ownership 
by top-tier managers (insiders) could have an important role in aligning the interests of managers and 
those of shareholders, thus enhancing shareholders’ control of the firm  (see Mikkelson and Partch, 
1989, and Cotter and Zenner, 1994). Higher share ownership by the target’s top-tier managers could 
lead to more incentives to push for a larger purchase premium. We empirically test the impact of 
managerial share ownership on bank merger prices. 
In addition to board independence and insider/managerial share ownership, large blockholders 
have also been found to play an important role in determining the firm’s value.  In particular, independent 
large blockholders, by exerting pressure on top management and potentially threatening to vote their 
shares to unseat management, could help to align the interest of managers with those of shareholders  
(see Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Barclay and Holderness, 1991; and Hadlock, Houston, and Ryngaert, 
1999).  We include the independent large blockholders’ variable in our analysis to test for its influence on 
merger prices.   
Our results indicate a significant positive relationship between the independence of the target’s 
board of directors and the size of the purchase premiums received by the target.  In addition, we find a 
strong negative relationship between the presence of large independent blockholders and merger prices, 
as well as a negative relationship between managerial share ownership and merger prices.  This 
negative correlation may be partially the result of large independent blockholders’ penchant for 
increasing the likelihood that a firm will become a merger or acquisition target and complete the merger 
transaction.  The independent director results imply that as board composition shifts toward more “inside   4
directors,” the target’s merger prices tend to fall, possibly due to insider directors’ willingness to 
“sacrifice” shareholders in order to keep their jobs and retain other benefits.   
This paper fills the literature gap related to the role of corporate governance (board 
independence, insider or managerial share ownership, and independent large blockholders) in the U.S. 
banking industry, especially in large transactions like mergers.  The remainder of this paper proceeds as 
follows.  A brief literature review is presented in section 2.  Our data and empirical methodology are 
described in section 3.  Our results are outlined in section 4.  And our conclusions are presented in 
section 5.  
   
2.    Literature Review  
Studies on M&As of nonfinancial firms have produced mixed results about the determinants of 
merger premiums, due to whether a merger is hostile or friendly and whether there are anti-takeover 
tools in place to counter unsolicited bids. Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Stulz (1988) show that in an 
environment without takeover defenses, even if target managers are opposed to a takeover, large 
takeover purchase premiums help hostile bids succeed by providing an incentive for target shareholders 
to fight management resistance. Moeller (2005) indicates that anti-takeover tools employed in the 1990s 
tend to shift power from target shareholders to target managers. If target managers trade purchase 
premiums in return for private benefits, as found in Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004) and Wulf (2004), 
target shareholders could lose part of the potential premium they would have received in a successful 
hostile transaction. Moeller (2005) shows that strong target managers, or weak target shareholders, are 
associated with lower purchase premium. Unlike analyses of nonfinancial firms, our analysis of bank 
mergers is less likely to suffer this ambiguity, since bank mergers require time-consuming regulatory 
approval, making hostile takeovers extremely difficult to execute.   
Independent Outside Directors — Several authors have suggested that corporate boards can be 
an important internal governance mechanism for protecting shareholders’ interests (see Fama, 1980, 
and Fama and Jensen, 1983).  Specifically, independent outside directors are thought to represent the   5
interests of shareholders because they could help to mitigate shareholder/management agency problems 
and could potentially play an important monitoring role in large-scale transactions, such as mergers.  An 
independent board is likely to have a better alignment with shareholders’ interests because it is in a 
better position to monitor and control managers (see Dunn, 1987).  In addition, independent directors 
could bring a greater breadth of experience to the board and improve the board’s effectiveness (see 
Firstenberg and Malkiel, 1980, and Vance, 1983).  If independent outside directors are more likely to 
make decisions consistent with maximizing shareholder’s wealth, then shareholder/management agency 
problems will be reduced.  
Consistent with this claim, Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994); Byrd and Hickman (1992); and 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) find relatively better stock market performance for firms whose board of 
directors is composed of relatively more outside, independent directors.  Weisbach (1988) and Byrd and 
Hickman (1992) find that independent boards tend to respond to poor performance by replacing the chief 
executive officer (CEO).   Subrahmanyam, Rangan, and Rosenstein (1997), however, find that 
independent boards have no extra value in evaluating acquisition targets. 
Cotter, Shivdasani, and Zenner (1997) find that for nonfinancial firms that are the targets of tender 
offers, the initial tender offer premium (over the target’s share price), bid premium revision, and target 
shareholder gains are higher when the target’s board is independent.
1  Brickley and James (1987) find 
that in states with more active banking takeover markets, the average fraction of the bank’s board that is 
composed of outside directors is higher than in other states, suggesting that board structure is important 
in determining the level of corporate control activity.  In this paper, we go a step further and examine the 
impact of independent outside directors on merger prices given the level of corporate control activity. 
In addition to board independence, the literature also identifies other factors that may be 
important to enhancing shareholders’ control of a firm.  These factors are board size, equity ownership 
by inside directors/top-tier managers, and the presence of large blockholders.   
                                                           
1 Board independence here is defined as having more than 50 percent independent directors.   6
Board Size — Yermack (1996) found an inverse relationship between firm value and board size, 
suggesting that smaller boards may be more effective decision makers.  However, his sample omitted 
banks and other financial firms.  We examine the impact of board size on merger prices. 
Managerial Share Ownership — Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) find that share ownership by 
managers may be an important device for aligning the interests of management with those of 
shareholders.  Mikkelson and Partch (1989) and Cotter and Zenner (1994) find that share ownership by 
managers is an important determinant of merger market efficiency.  For bank mergers, Brickley and 
James (1987), Allen and Cebenoyan (1991), and Carter and Stover (1991) find that share ownership by 
managers and directors is beneficial to shareholders of banks.   Similarly, for nonbanking studies, 
Mikkelson and Partch (1989) and Cotter and Zenner (1994) show that with greater share ownership by 
managers, managerial gains from merger offers are larger and managerial resistance less likely. 
McConnell and Servaes (1990) demonstrate that the larger proportion of share ownership by managers 
increases firm value and thus should lead to a larger purchase premium.  On the other hand, Moeller 
(2005) offers an alternative view that suggests a negative relationship between share ownership of the 
target’s top-tier managers and merger prices. This view claims that managers tend to trade extra merger 
purchase premiums for their own private benefits (such as job security and higher compensation and 
perquisites in the post-merger organization) at the expense of target shareholders.  Consistent with 
Moeller (2005), Hartzell, Ofek, and Yermack (2004), and Wulf (2004) examine how the pecuniary and 
nonpecuniary benefits that target CEOs receive in merger transactions influence target shareholders’ 
wealth.  They find that managers pursue personal interests and are willing to trade off purchase 
premiums for personal benefits.  We include a measure of managerial ownership in our empirical 
analysis.  
Our study complements Moeller (2005) in two important respects.  First, we use a single industry, 
which helps eliminate the need for (often imprecise) industry control variables.  More important, the 
banking industry is exceptionally suited to this type of analysis because of the infrequency of hostile 
takeovers.  As mentioned earlier, whether a merger is hostile or friendly in nature could cause the   7
coefficient estimates for the impact of managerial share ownership on the premium received by 
shareholders to reverse signs (see Moeller, 2005).  This presents certain estimation and identification 
problems.  Second, we use a broader definition of managerial ownership than Moeller (2005).   
Lefanowicz, Robinson, and Smith (2000) suggest that managers tend to make decisions as a team, 
especially for large-scale transactions like mergers.  To capture this impact on target merger prices, we 
use share ownership information on the top five managers as reported in the proxy statements. 
Independent Large Blockholders — Previous research, such as Shleifer and Vishny (1986); 
Barclay and Holderness (1991); and Hadlock, Houston, and Ryngaert (1999), has shown that unaffiliated 
(independent) large blockholders can have an impact on corporate control decisions.  They may facilitate 
control changes by using the “threat” to vote their shares to unseat management in a proxy contest.  
They may also exert pressure on top management to accept a reasonably attractive acquisition offer, 
resulting in larger gains to target shareholders.   Brook, Hendershott, and Lee (1998) find consistent 
results that banks with large independent blockholders are more likely to become a takeover target, but 
on the contrary, they find that the presence of independent blockholders is associated with smaller 
merger announcement period returns.  We test for the effects of the presence of independent large 
blockholders on merger prices, controlling for a run-up in stock prices prior to the announcement date. 
Other Control Factors — The literature documents several factors other than corporate 
governance that may have a significant impact on merger prices.  These other factors include such items 
as asset size, profitability, capital-asset ratio, and means of payment (see Beatty, Santomero, and 
Smirlock, 1987; Cheng, Gup, and Wall, 1989; Fraser and Kolari, 1988; Rogowski and Simonson, 1989; 
Rose, 1991; and Brewer, Jackson, Jagtiani, and Nguyen, 2000).  Shawky, Kilb, and Staas (1996) find 
that smaller targets tend to be offered a larger bid premium, and Palia (1993) finds that the relative size 
of targets and bidding banks is important in explaining the variation in the bid premiums.  With regard to 
performance, Shawky, Kilb, and Staas (1996) and Brewer, Jackson, Jagtiani, and Nguyen (2000) find 
that greater merger premiums tend to be offered to target banks with higher profitability.  We control for 
all of these factors in our empirical specification.     8
Our results shed light on whether the banking organization’s board of directors’ structure, the 
presence of independent large blockholders, or managerial share ownership influence M&A purchase 
premiums, thus affecting the size and distribution of wealth created by M&A transactions. 
 
3.   The Data and Empirical Methodology  
3.1   Data Description: 
The data used to examine the relation between merger prices, corporate governance, and control 
variables are collected from a sample of bank M&A transactions that took place from 1990 to 2004.  The 
details about the merger deals are obtained from Thomson Financial Securities Data (formerly Securities 
Data Corporation (SDC)).  We started with the SDC sample of all bank mergers between 1990 and 2004, 
a total of 11,252 transactions.  Of these reported 11,252 transactions, less than 65 percent were 
completed.  We restrict our analysis to only completed merger transactions, yielding 7,185 observations.  
Most of these 7,185 reported merger transactions are then excluded because they represent internal 
restructurings (where reported target and acquirer have the same CUSIP number) rather than changing 
ownership and control, or because they are mergers that involve foreign entities, semi-private firms 
(where stock price of the target is not available), or missing deal information. These exclusions reduce 
the number of observations from 7,185 to 693.  Of these 693 transactions, we were able to obtain 
complete corporate governance information from proxy statements for 558 firms. 
Financial data are obtained from the quarterly reports filed by banks and thrifts (Call Reports) and 
bank holding companies (Y-9 Reports).  The merger announcement date, target name, acquirer name, 
value of the deal, and other characteristics of the merger announcement come from the Thomson 
Financial Securities Data database.  Summary statistics of the sample are presented in Table 1. 
   
    9
3.2   The Basic Model:   
Shareholder prices 
 
  We proxy the return to the target shareholders using two different measures:  (1) the purchase 
premium at the announcement date over the target’s stock price 20 trading days before the 
announcement date and (2) the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over the event window [-1, 0] 
around the merger announcement date. We also measure the CARs to the acquirer over the same event 
window. 
Our measure of the abnormal returns associated with the merger announcement follows the 
event study-based methodology in Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988).  Specifically, we calculate the CARs 
over the event window [-1, 0] for targets and acquirers around the merger announcement date.  The 
market model is used to calculate abnormal returns (ARi,t) for firm i and for event date t as: 
  , ˆ ˆ , , , t m i i t i t i R R AR       
where Ri,t = return to firm i on day t;  i  ˆ ,  i  ˆ = market model parameter estimates, and Rm,t = return to the 
value-weighted NYSE market portfolio on day t. The market model parameter estimates for each firm are 
obtained using a maximum of 240 trading days of daily returns data beginning 300 trading days prior to 
the event date — i.e., market returns over the window [-300, -60] to avoid any impact from leakage of 
news about the mergers.  The cumulative abnormal return (CARi,[-1, 0]) for the event window [-1, 0] is 






, ] 0 , 1 [ , t i i AR CAR  
The z-statistic is used to determine whether the abnormal returns are statistically significant.  
The Importance of Board Composition and Independent Directors: 
  Our empirical model specification is designed to capture the impact of the degree of 
shareholders’ control (as proxied by the proportion of independent directors, the target’s managerial   10
share ownership, and the presence of independent large blockholders) on the takeover premiums and 
the CARs around the merger announcement date. 
 Board  Composition — Each of the directors is classified as being independent or non-
independent as follows. Non-independent directors are present or past employees of the bank, directors 
who are family members of insiders, or directors who have some business ties to the bank (e.g., 
attorneys whose firm represents the bank, consultants to the bank).  Independent directors are neither 
current nor past employees of the bank, and they must not have substantial business or family ties with 
management (as indicated in the proxy statement) or have potential business ties with the bank.  Cotter, 
Shivdansani, and Zenner (1997) define a board as independent when independent directors are more 
than 50 percent of the board membership.  However, unlike boards at nonbanking firms, the average 
bank board tends to have substantially more than 50 percent independent directors. The median 
proportion of independent directors for our sample of banking organizations is 75.5 percent.  We use this 
number to create an indicator variable for board independence.   The indicator variable Indepdirect is 
equal to one if the percent of the board of directors that is independent is greater than 75.5 percent, and 
zero otherwise.   
Board Size -- Previous study finds that the impact of corporate governance on the abnormal 
returns to shareholders may vary according to firm size – see Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007).  In 
addition, since boards of directors at larger banks tend to have a large proportion of independent outside 
directors, we control for the target’s board size, BDSIZE, in our empirical specification to isolate the 
impact of independent outside directors on the purchase premiums and the CARs.   
Target’s Managerial Share Ownership — Share ownership by managers could play a 
significant role in aligning the interest of managerial and board interests with those of shareholders.  It is 
measured as a percentage of equity ownership by the top-tier managers (as reported in the last proxy 
statement prior to the merger announcement date).  Following Lefanowicz, Robinson, and Smith (2000), 
we define top-tier managers as the top five executives typically reported in the proxy statements.  Rather 
than restricting the managerial share ownership to only the CEO’s equity ownership, we include the top   11
five executives’ equity ownership in recognition that these other senior executives could also play an 
important role in corporate control changing events. The indicator variable MSHARE is equal to one if the 
target’s managerial share ownership is greater than the median percentage (5.1809 percent) for our 
sample targets, and zero otherwise.    
Independent Large Blockholders — The presence of large block shareholders could play an 
important role in determining the degree of shareholder control and could help to mitigate any agency 
conflicts between shareholders and manager, since shareholder intervention by large block shareholders 
would be more likely. Previous research finds that independent block shareholders can have an impact 
on important issues such as corporate control decisions. We define an independent blockholder (at least 
5 percent ownership) as a blockholder that does not have substantial business or family ties with 
management (as indicated in the proxy statement).  We include in the analysis a binary variable 
Indepblock that is equal to one if there is a large independent blockholder (with at least 5 percent share 
ownership), and zero otherwise.   
Control Factors: 
Our empirical specification controls for other important factors not related to corporate 
governance and board structure but referenced in the corporate finance literature.  These factors include:   
Cash vs. Stock Offer —  Whether the merger deals are stock offers or cash offers could 
potentially affect the acquisition purchase premiums and the CARs because of the differential tax 
implications associated with these offers.  A cash offer may be viewed positively by the market, since it 
may allow the acquiring bank to increase its depreciation tax shields, since the depreciation basis of the 
acquired assets will rise to their market value.  For the targets, however, a cash offer may be viewed 
negatively because it imposes a greater immediate tax burden to target shareholders.  The empirical 
findings so far have been mixed.  Shawky, Kilb, and Staas (1996) find that the bid premiums offered to 
target banks are larger for stock deals than for cash deals.  However, Cornett and De (1991) find that 
mergers that are financed with only stock or only cash produce higher abnormal returns to target 
shareholders relative to those financed with combinations of stock and cash.  Other studies that examine   12
this issue in the context of nonbank mergers find the medium of payment to be unimportant (see Eckbo 
and Langohr, 1989, and Travlos, 1987).  We include the means of payment (STOCK) as a control 
variable to capture any potential impact of the means of payment on shareholder prices.  The binary 
variable  STOCK  is equal to one if more than 50 percent of the value is paid in stocks, and zero 
otherwise. This information is obtained from the Thomson Financial Securities Data database. 
Profitability and Variability of Returns — Acquisition purchase premiums and the CARs could 
be influenced by a variety of factors other than shareholder control and means of payment variables. 
Several of these factors reflect the difference between the value the acquirer places on control of the 
target versus the value the market places on owning a non-controlling interest in the firm.  The starting 
point for measuring the value of the target both as a stand-alone firm and in an acquisition is its current 
profitability and its variability of returns.  We measure the target’s profitability (RET) by its stock market 
returns over the one-year period (252 trading days) ending 60 trading days prior to the merger 
announcement date. The variability of returns (VRET) is measured by the variance of the target’s daily 
stock market returns over the one-year period (252 trading days) ending 60 trading days prior to the 
merger announcement.  
Relative Asset Size of Target and Acquirer — The relative asset ratio (RELATIVE) is meant to 
capture the acquirer’s ability to reduce the costs of producing the combined organization’s product mix by 
achieving economies of scale.  The variable RELATIVE, which is defined as the target’s total assets 
divided by the acquirer’s total assets, may be either positively or negatively associated with the 
attractiveness of a given target.  If a larger relative asset ratio provides a greater opportunity for merger-
related efficiencies to be realized, then the relative asset ratio should be positively correlated with merger 
prices.  A countervailing factor in large bank mergers, however, is the difficulty of merging two large 
banking organizations or two organizations of equal size.  According to organization theorists, melding 
cultures in a merger is more difficult and costly when the target is more equal in size to the acquirer (see 
Benston, Hunter, and Wall, 1995).     13
Book to Market Value of Assets — The book value of total assets divided by the market value 
of total assets is included as a measure of how investors view the target’s prospects. Market value of 
total assets is computed by subtracting the book value of capital from the book value of total assets and 
adding the market value of capital (defined as share price times the number of common shares 
outstanding). 
Capitalization or Leverage Ratio — Banking organizations are required by regulation to hold 
enough capital to support the risk they take.  This risk-based minimum capital requirement and the 
leverage ratio are aimed at reducing the risk-taking propensities of bank shareholders. Previous studies 
have found mixed results related to the impact of capitalization.  According to the “signaling hypothesis,” 
“it will prove less costly for a ‘good’ bank to signal better quality through increased capital than for a ‘bad’ 
bank” (see Berger, Herring, and Szego 1995). Therefore, target banks with lower leverage can signal 
favorable information, leading to higher acquisition premiums and thus merger prices.  Conversely, Ross 
(1977) argues that higher, rather than lower, leverage signals positive information, since signaling good 
quality through high leverage would be less onerous for a “good” bank than for a “bad” bank. 
Furthermore, Shawky, Kilb, and Staas (1996) find that higher bid premiums tend to be offered to target 
banks with higher leverage due to more efficient use of capital. We include the target’s book value of the 
capital-to-asset ratio (CRATIO) in the quarter ending prior to the merger announcement date as a proxy 
for the bank’s capital adequacy and leverage.   
Target’s Excess Returns — To control for the possible anticipation of a takeover that could have 
caused a run-up of the target’s share price prior to the merger announcement date, we include the 
target’s excess return over a 10-day trading period ending 20 trading days prior to the merger 
announcement date.  
Other Control Factors — Other factors include the natural logarithm of the target’s total assets 
and the time-period indicator variables (TINDt where t=2,...,T) for the year of the merger announcement 
that ranges between 1990 and 2004. These year indicator variables are introduced to account for the   14
effect of omitted macroeconomic and other activity over time and thus merger prices.variables that may 
influence the overall level of acquisition  
 
4.    The Empirical Results  
4.1  Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for our sample of 558 mergers. Target shareholders 
received a mean purchase premium of over 35 percent above the target’s stock price (as of 20 trading 
days prior to the deal announcement). The acquirers are, on average, much larger than the targets, 
where the mean ratio of target assets to the acquirer’s assets is 0.2676. The mean share ownership of 
the target’s top five managers prior to the merger is 7.48 percent. On average, over 73 percent of the 
targets’ boards are independent outside directors.  Independent large blockholders hold a little over 7.75 
percent of the common shares, on average. Over 83 percent of the transactions are stock rather than 
cash deals in which more than 50 percent of the value is paid in stocks.    
Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients among the various explanatory variables in our 
model.  Independent boards tend to be associated with larger board size and smaller managerial share 
ownership. In addition, targets with a larger managerial share ownership ratio tend to exhibit greater 
variability of returns.  And large managerial share ownership is more common for a smaller board size.   
 
4.2  Corporate Governance and Target Shareholder Returns  
The impact of the target’s corporate governance structure on the merger premium (based on the 
target’s stock prices as of 20 trading days prior to the merger announcement date) and on the target 
shareholders’ CARs is presented in Table 3.  Columns (1) and (3) show the results for a basic model that 
specifies each target shareholder price only as a function of shareholder control and a means of payment 
variables plus year fixed effects.  Columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 add the control variables to the 
specifications in columns (1) and (3).   15
Independent outside directors — The significant positive coefficients of the variable Indepdirect in 
columns (1) and (3) of Table 3 indicate that independent boards are related to higher merger abnormal 
returns and purchase premiums secured by the target.  This is consistent with the implication that as 
targets' corporate boards tilt toward a greater percentage of insider directors, merger prices for target 
shareholders will be lower.      
Managerial share ownership — Columns (1) and (3) of Table 3 also include a measure of the 
target’s share ownership by top-tier managers (insiders).   Note that these insiders may or may not be on 
the board of directors, but they do represent insiders’ ownership and voting rights.  The coefficients of the 
variable MSHARE are negative in both columns (1) and (3) of Table 3, although this is only marginally 
significant for the abnormal returns model in column (1) and insignificant for the takeover premium model 
in column (3). The results, however, suggest that more top-tier management equity ownership is 
associated with smaller merger prices.  These results are consistent with earlier evidence on nonfinancial 
firms in Moeller (2005), who finds that a low fraction of CEO share ownership is associated with larger 
takeover premiums in his sample of nonfinancial targets. 
Independent large blockholders — The coefficients of the variable Indepblock are negative and 
significant (at the 1 percent level or better) for both the target’s abnormal returns (column 1) and the 
takeover premium (column 3).  This is consistent with an argument that when a target does not have 
independent large blockholders that could force acceptance of a “reasonable” takeover offer, top-tier 
managers tend to demand an excessively high purchase premium (to compensate for loss in job security 
and other benefits), thus leading to higher abnormal returns to target shareholders and larger takeover 
premiums.  
Columns (2) and (4) of Table 3 add the control variables to the specifications in columns (1) and 
(3). The results in columns (2) and (4) are qualitatively similar to those in columns (1) and (3).   
Indepdirect remains positively and statistically correlated with both measures of merger prices. The 
Indepblock variable also remains negative and statistically significantly correlated with both measures of   16
merger prices, and the magnitude of the coefficient estimates in columns (2) and (4) is larger than those 
in columns (1) and (3).  
The coefficients on the managerial ownership variable, MSHARE, remain negatively correlated 
with both measures of merger prices but is also now statistically significant at the 1 percent level for both 
abnormal returns (column 2) and takeover premiums (column 4).   This is consistent with an argument 
that there is significant conflict of interest as share ownership by top-tier managers is less likely to 
maximize shareholders’ wealth due to trading merger premiums for their own private benefits (such as 
future job opportunities with acquirer and higher compensation and perquisites in the post-merger 
organization).  This pattern of conflict of interest seems to prevail in both banking (highly regulated) and 
nonbanking firms.  
Control Factors — None of the coefficients on the return variables (stock market return of the 
target, RET, and the variance of the stock market return of the target, VRET) are significant in either the 
target abnormal return equation or the target purchase premium equation.  The size of the target (proxied 
by Log of TA) is negatively correlated with both measures of merger prices and is statistically significant 
in both equations. The coefficient on the relative asset sizes of the two firms, RELATIVE, is significantly 
negative (at the 1 percent level) in explaining the target abnormal returns, suggesting that larger targets 
(relative to the acquirers) are perceived less positively by the market and generally tend to have lower 
CARs, probably due to increasing difficulty in integrating larger firms.  In the purchase premium equation, 
the coefficient on the relative asset variable is negative but not significant.  The target’s book value-to-
market value ratio is positively correlated with merger prices, while the target’s capital-asset ratio is 
negatively correlated with merger prices. The significantly positive coefficients on the target’s book value-
to-market value ratio in both columns (2) and (4) indicate that there may be greater opportunities for the 
bidding bank to improve the target's efficiency, ceteris paribus, when the target’s market value of assets 
is not much larger than the book value, thus resulting in larger abnormal returns to target shareholders 
and larger takeover premiums.  The significantly negative coefficients on the capital-asset ratio in 
columns (2) and (4) are consistent with the signaling argument by Ross (1977) that signaling good   17
quality through high leverage would be less onerous for a “good” bank than for a “bad” bank.   It is also 
consistent with an argument that a higher leverage ratio represents a more efficient use of capital, thus 
leading to a higher purchase premium.  The variable RUNUP is included to separate out the run-up effect 
of the target’s share price prior to the merger announcement date, and the coefficients are not significant 
in either of the equations. 
 
4.3    Corporate Governance and Acquirer Shareholder Returns 
  
The impact of the target’s corporate governance structure on the CARs to acquirers around the 
merger announcement date is presented in column (3) of Table 4.  For convenience, the parallel impact 
on the target’s abnormal returns for the same window (column 1) and on takeover premiums (column 2) 
is also included in Table 4.  The model specification here is slightly different than that of Table 3.  In 
these specifications, we define a jointly low shareholder control indicator variable as equal to 1 for targets 
with a percentage of managerial share ownership greater than the sample median and at least one large 
independent blockholder, and zero otherwise.  This variable selects the 28 percent of the sample firms 
with the lowest levels of target shareholder control. 
Managerial share ownership and large blockholders — The coefficients of the indicator variable 
for managerial share ownership being larger than the sample median and (jointly) having at least one 
independent blockholder are significantly negative in both columns (1) and (2).  The results indicate that 
a larger managerial share ownership and the presence of large independent blockholders serve to 
reduce the target shareholders’ merger prices in completed takeovers, both in terms of CARs around the 
merger date and in terms of purchase premiums.  This is consistent with the results discussed earlier 
from Table 3, where the managerial share ownership and the presence of independent large 
blockholders were analyzed separately.   Managerial share ownership at target banks does not seem to 
enhance firm value as predicted.  In addition, independent large blockholders seem to use their power to 
push for completion of takeover attempts that may not be a perfect match, resulting in lower purchase 
premiums being accepted and smaller abnormal returns to target shareholders.    18
Unlike for target shareholders, the coefficient for this joint indicator variable is significantly positive 
in column (3). This indicates larger abnormal returns to shareholders of the bidding firm around the 
merger announcement date when the target has larger managerial share ownership (maximizing their 
own benefits rather than target shareholders’ wealth) and at least one independent large blockholder 
(pressuring the target’s management team to accept a reasonable but not so “great” offer).  It is arguable 
that the acquirer may also contract with top-tier managerial shareholders to cooperate in mergers that 
would transfer wealth from target shareholders to the acquirer shareholders, possibly in exchange for job 
security and other perks in the combined organization.   
Regarding independent outside directors, the target’s independent directors benefit their 
shareholders in terms of larger CARs and larger takeover premiums, as indicated by significant positive 
coefficients of the Indepdirect variable in columns (1) and (2).  This is consistent with results for the 
impact of independent directors found in previous studies for nonbanking firms.  As shown in column (3), 
the impact of the target’s independent outside directors on the acquirer shareholders is negative but 
insignificant.  
  Overall, we find that the low shareholder control indicator variable has a significantly negative 
effect on the purchase premium and abnormal returns to target shareholders but significantly positive 
abnormal returns to acquirer shareholders. This result suggests that when there is a low level of 
shareholder control (as proxied by relatively high managerial share ownership and the presence of a 
large independent blockholder), a target’s management team is more likely to agree to merger terms that 
are more favorable to acquirers. 
 
5. Conclusions  
The objective of this paper is to examine the balance of control between top-tier managers and 
shareholders using data from bank mergers over the period 1990-2004.  Several studies have 
investigated the role of independent outside directors at nonfinancial firms.  Independent boards (with   19
more than 50 percent outside directors) have been reported in the corporate finance literature to be 
associated with larger shareholder gains and more effective monitoring of management.  Unlike the 
corporate finance literature on nonfinancial firms, the role of independent outside directors in banking 
firms has not received much attention in the literature.  The role of independent outside directors in 
banking firms could be very different from those of nonfinancial firms due to banking regulations and 
supervision (at the state and federal level), deposit insurance, and too-big-to-fail implications for very 
large banks.   
We define bank boards to be independent if the proportion of independent directors is more than 
our sample median of 77.5 percent.  We use criteria higher than the usual 50 percent used for 
nonfinancial firms because banks are more likely to seek more outside directors.  Our model controls for 
the risk characteristics of the target banks, the deal characteristics, and the economic environment.  The 
results are robust and indicate a significant positive relationship between independence of the target’s 
board and the size of merger prices — i.e., the abnormal returns and the merger premiums accrued to 
target shareholders.  Unlike independent outside directors, the target’s managerial share ownership and 
the presence of independent blockholders have a negative impact on the merger price of the target bank.  
Our results are consistent with the implication that as corporate boards increase the percentage 
of inside directors, merger prices negotiated for target shareholders tend to decrease. A possible 
explanation for this is that top-tier managers tend to trade potential takeover gains in return for their own 
personal benefits in terms of job security and other post-acquisition benefits with the bidding firm. The 
positive and significant results that we report in Table 4 for the acquirers’ abnormal returns around the 
merger announcement dates support this conjecture.    20
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical specifications 
 
This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analyses. The number of 
observations is 558. 
 
Variable Mnemonic  Mean  Median  Std. 
Deviation 
Purchase premium over stock price 20 
days before (%)  PREM20  35.80% 31.83%  24.77% 
Target cumulative abnormal return [-1, 0]  TCAR  12.93% 9.01%  15.55% 
Acquirer cumulative abnormal return [-1, 
0] 
ACAR  -1.28% -0.99%  3.81% 
Target stock market return over the 252 
trading days 60 days prior to the merger 
announcement date (%) 
RET 
25.87% 22.52%  36.97% 
Target variance of the daily stock returns 
over the 252 trading days 60 days prior to 
the merger announcement date 
VRET 
0.0007 0.0005  0.0012 
Target assets/Acquirer assets (%)  RELATIVE  26.76% 14.95%  31.54% 
Target’s number of directors  BDSIZE  11.0197 10.0000  4.6706 
Target’s percentage  of outside directors  
% Indepdirect  73.3607 75.5000  14.1842 
Target’s percentage of equity ownership 
by large independent blockholders  % Indepblock   7.7593 5.4696 10.4123 
Target’s percentage of equity ownership 
by management  % MSHARE   7.4765 5.1809  8.1943 
A binary variable equal to one if more 
than 50 percent of the value of the 
acquisition is paid in stock, and equal to 
zero otherwise 
STOCK 
0.8351 1.0000  0.3714 
Target total assets prior to offer (Million) 
TA  $6,410.5 $884.4 $24,394.4 
Book value of total assets divided by 
market value of total assets  B-M  0.9498 0.9546  0.0498 
Book value of capital divided by book 
value of total assets  CRATIO  0.0903 0.0827  0.0357 24 
 
Table 2: Correlation coefficients of the variables in the empirical specifications 
 
 
 RET  VRET  RELATIVE  BDSIZE  %Indepdirect  %Indepblock %MSHARE  STOCK  TA    B-M  CRATIO RUNUP 
RET 1.00                     
VRET  -0.0696  1.00                   
RELATIVE  -0.0549  -0.0289  1.00                 
BDSIZE  -0.0315  -0.0623  0.1123***  1.00               
%Indepdirect 0.0455  -0.1147***  -0.0072  0.3057***  1.00             
%Indepblock 0.0823*  -0.0273 -0.02  -0.1816***  0.0734*  1.00           
%MSHARE -0.0793*  0.3603***  -0.1358***  -0.2548***  -0.3757***  -0.0317  1.00         
STOCK 0.002  -0.0133  0.0345  0.1302***  0.0513  -0.1321***  -0.0656  1.00       
TA  -0.0519  -0.0442  0.2446*** 0.2299*** 0.1506***  -0.055  -0.1463***  0.0777*  1.00     
B-M -0.1632***  0.1624***  0.0162  -0.1062** -0.0268  0.1064***  0.0923** -0.2272***  -0.0985**  1.00    
CRATIO -0.1378***  -0.0649  -0.0293  -0.1702*** -0.1786***  -0.1140***  -0.0048  -0.1129*** -0.1110*** -0.0007 1.00   
RUNUP    -0.1651***  -0.0676  -0.0438 -0.0626 -0.0003  0.0402 -0.035  -0.0676  0.0076 0.0151  -0.0105  1.00 
 25 
 
Table 3: The impact of corporate governance variables on 20-day purchase premiums and 
cumulative abnormal returns [-1, 0] 
 
BDSIZE is the size of target board of directors. Indepdirect is a binary variable for independent directors. 
It is equal to one if the proportion of independent directors is greater than the median percentage (75.50) 
for our sample of acquisitions, and zero otherwise. MSHARE is a binary variable for the target managerial 
share ownership. It is equal to one if the percentage of managerial share ownership is greater than the 
median percentage (5.1809) for our sample of targets, and zero otherwise. The percentage of equity 
ownership by management is obtained from the last proxy statement prior to the merger announcement 
date. Indepblock is a binary variable for large blockholders that do not have substantial business or family 
ties with management as indicated in the proxy statement. It is equal to one if there is at least one large 
independent blockholder, and zero otherwise. The specifications in columns (2) and (4) add the stock 
market return of the target over the 252 trading days 60 trading days prior to the merger announcement 
date (RET); the variance of the stock market return of the target using daily data over the 252 trading 
days 60 trading days prior to the merger announcement (VRET); the target banking organization’s total 
assets divided by the acquirer’s total assets (RELATIVE); a binary variable equal to one if more than 50 
percent of the value is paid in stock, and equal to zero otherwise (STOCK); the book value of total assets 
divided by the market value of total assets; the book capital to book total assets ratio (CRATIO); and the 
cumulative excess returns (RUNUP) over a 10-day period 20 days prior to the merger announcement 
date. Market value of total assets is computed by subtracting the book value of capital from the book 
value of total assets and adding the market value of capital (defined as share price times the number of 
common shares outstanding). Time period indicators are included in all of the empirical specifications 
reported below. Robust t-statistics (with White’s Correction) are reported in the column next to the 
coefficient estimates. We have 558 observations, as we excluded four transactions from the empirical 
specifications because they were outliers. The t-statistics and F-statistics are starred if they are significant 
at the 10 (*), 5(**), and 1 (***) percent level. 
 
  Target return  Takeover premium 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Coefficient T-ratio  Coefficient  T-ratio  Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient  T-ratio 
Intercept  0.1716 4.58
*** -0.0497  -0.27  0.3568 6.89
*** -0.7280  -2.00
** 
BDSIZE  -0.0026 -1.94
* -0.0005  -0.33 -0.0057  -2.61
*** -0.0004  -0.17 
 Indepdirect  0.0414 3.04




MSHARE   -0.0254 -1.87
* -0.0402 -2.97
*** -0.0129  -0.60  -0.0469  -2.30
** 
Indepblock   -0.0360 2.74
*** -0.0392 -3.00
*** -0.0760 -3.56
*** -0.0894  4.36
*** 
STOCK  -0.0250  -1.33 -0.0202  -1.08 -0.0043 -0.18 0.0158  0.68 
RET (%)  ------- 
 
-0.0241 -1.12  -------   -0.0416  -1.08 
VRET  ------- 
 
-5.4665 -1.46  -------   -8.9388  -1.23 
Log of TA  ------- 
 
-0.0116 -2.46
** -------    -0.0244  -3.23
*** 26 
 
RELATIVE  ------- 
 
-0.0565 -3.05
*** -------    -0.0451 -1.34 
Book value of total 
assets divided by 





*** -------    1.6820 5.09
*** 
CRATIO  ------- 
 
-0.7260 -4.43
*** -------    -1.5162  -6.17
*** 
RUNUP  ------- 
 
-0.0632 -0.64  -------   -0.0292  -0.22 
Number of 




558  558 
 
R




0.0702  0.1869 
 
F-statistic  3.35
***    3.97
***    3.21
***  5.92
***   
Chi-square statistic 
testing the joint 
















Table 4: Acquirer effects of target shareholder control  
 
Target cumulative abnormal return [-1, 0] around the announcement date is the dependent variable in 
Column 1; target takeover premium is the dependent variable in Column 2; and acquirer cumulative 
abnormal return [-1, 0] around the announcement date is the dependent variable in Column 3. Indepdirect 
is a binary variable for independent directors. It is equal to one if the proportion of independent directors 
is greater than the median percentage for our sample of acquisitions, and zero otherwise. The 
specifications include the stock market return of the target over the 252 trading days 60 trading days prior 
to the merger announcement date (RET); the variance of the stock market return of the target using daily 
data over the 252 trading days 60 trading days prior to the merger announcement (VRET); the target 
banking organization’s total assets divided by the acquirer’s total assets (RELATIVE); a binary variable 
equal to one if more than 50 percent of the value is paid in stock, and equal to zero otherwise (STOCK); 
the book value of total assets divided by the market value of total assets; the book capital to book total 
assets ratio; and the cumulative excess returns (RUNUP) over a 10-day period 20 days prior to the 
merger announcement date. Market value of total assets is computed by subtracting the book value of 
capital from the book value of total assets and adding the market value of capital (defined as share price 
times the number of common shares outstanding). Time period indicators are included in all of the 
empirical specifications reported below. Robust t-statistics (with White’s Correction) are reported in the 
column next to the coefficient estimates. The t-statistics and F-statistics are starred if they are significant 
at the 10 (*), 5(**), and 1 (***) percent level. 
 
 






  Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient T-ratio Coefficient  T-ratio 
Intercept  -0.0583 -0.33 -0.7456  -2.72
*** 0.0137  0.30 
 Indepdirect  0.0425 3.25
*** 0.0514  2.55
** -0.0018  -0.60 
Percent of managerial share 
ownership greater than median and 
presence of at least one large 
independent blockholder indicator 
variable 
-0.0359 -2.45
** -0.0594  -2.66
*** 0.0076  2.42
** 
STOCK  -0.0191 -1.02 0.0208 0.88  -0.0032  -0.73 
RET(%)  -0.0297 -1.39 -0.0519  -1.34  0.0016 0.31 
VRET  -5.4320 -1.48 -8.1272  -1.09  -0.0042  -0.01 
Log of TA  -0.0101 -2.20
** -0.0218  -2.87
*** -0.0026  -1.89
* 
RELATIVE  -0.0569 -3.11
*** -0.0508 -1.50 0.0005  0.06 
Book value of total assets divided by 
market value of total assets 
0.4423 2.75
*** 1.5871  5.29
*** 0.0151  0.38 
CRATIO  -0.6742 -4.21
*** -1.4029  -5.79
*** 0.0230  0.49 28 
 
RUNUP  -0.0880 -0.90 -0.0879 -0.66  ------- 
 












***    5.50
***    1.82
**  
 
 
 
 
 